Terrorist activity in the Lake Chad Basin has risen sharply in 2025, with factions of Boko Haram primarily the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) mounting increasingly coordinated and deadly operations. ISWAP’s “Camp Holocaust” campaign alone has accounted for hundreds of deaths and more than two hundred attacks this year, while JAS continues to demonstrate a renewed capacity to launch bold, high impact assaults. Although many factors contribute to this resurgence, one element stands out as central to both groups’ current effectiveness: the deliberate expansion and refinement of their intelligence gathering capabilities.
Over the past several years, both ISWAP and JAS have developed highly structured intelligence units embedded within their broader military and administrative systems. These units play a critical role in planning, reconnaissance, logistics, internal discipline, and operational execution. Among them is the hisbah, a police style body that publicly serves as an internal regulatory force but in practice acts as a crucial intelligence conduit. Members of the hisbah are deeply integrated into communities under or adjacent to Boko Haram’s influence. Many adopt civilian identities as farmers, traders, herders, and artisans, allowing them to collect information discreetly and blend seamlessly into everyday social environments.
At the tactical level, field commanders known as qaids oversee hundreds of fighters and coordinate specialized reconnaissance operations. Testimonies from former operatives reveal that before major attacks, qaids deploy intelligence teams into target communities days or even weeks in advance. These operatives quietly observe troop movements, security vulnerabilities, terrain conditions, and civilian activity. They return with detailed assessments that enable militants to time their operations precisely, strike critical assets, and withdraw before state forces can mount an effective response.
Boko Haram’s intelligence strength also rests on its ability to leverage the social networks of its fighters and local supporters. Many insurgents maintain close ties with family members and acquaintances living in nearby towns and settlements. These contacts often willingly or under coercion provide information about military patrols, local leadership decisions, and community dynamics. Some fighters move regularly between insurgent camps and their home villages, using these visits to gather fresh intelligence while sustaining their social cover.
Rural populations that depend on fishing, farming, and cattle rearing are particularly vulnerable to Boko Haram’s coercive tactics. In many areas around Lake Chad, access to essential resources is effectively controlled by insurgent factions. Communities are frequently pressured to supply information in exchange for permission to fish, cultivate land, graze livestock, or travel safely between locations. This forced collaboration generates a steady flow of actionable intelligence while deepening the group’s entrenchment in local economic systems.
Another factor reinforcing Boko Haram’s information networks is its strategic exploitation of disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programs. While these initiatives are essential to reducing the number of active combatants, they have not always been accompanied by sufficient monitoring or ongoing support. As a result, some former fighters leave DDR programs and rejoin insurgent ranks, often bringing with them valuable insights into government security structures, community perceptions, and military response patterns. This phenomenon represents an ongoing vulnerability in regional counterterrorism efforts.
Technological advancements have further expanded Boko Haram’s intelligence reach. The group now utilizes mobile communication tools, social media platforms, and high-resolution digital imagery to support surveillance and coordination. Messaging applications enable operatives to share real-time photos, videos, and coordinates from reconnaissance missions. In some documented cases, the group has deployed drones to observe military installations and track vehicle movements. These technologies, while relatively simple, significantly enhance the precision and effectiveness of the group’s operations.
Boko Haram factions have also attempted to penetrate the security apparatus of regional states. Through bribery, manipulation, or impersonation of demobilised fighters, militants have on occasion gained access to military facilities or secured sensitive information about planned operations. Such incidents highlight the ongoing difficulties faced by security forces in environments where insurgents are adept at blending into civilian populations and exploiting institutional weaknesses.
The cumulative impact of these intelligence networks is profound. Accurate, timely information allows Boko Haram to execute attacks with surgical precision, avoid fortified positions, anticipate military countermeasures, and ensure the uninterrupted flow of supplies and personnel. In many cases, the group’s intelligence capabilities have outpaced those of the states attempting to neutralize them.
To counter this rising threat, governments in the Lake Chad Basin must adopt a more integrated and intelligence driven approach. Strengthening human intelligence collection, enhancing open-source monitoring, and improving imagery analysis capabilities should be central components of this strategy. Equally important is fortifying DDR programs with sustained follow up, as well as building community resilience through improved economic support, trust-building measures, and protection mechanisms that reduce civilians’ dependence on insurgent groups.
Only by degrading Boko Haram’s intelligence apparatus and bolstering that of the state can the region begin to reverse the group’s growing operational momentum.
